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COUNTY SHERIFF; MICHAEL M. BUSCH, SCOTT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF; PATRICK MORGAN, SCOTT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF; DAVID EINERTSON, SCOTT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF; NORMAN PINT, SCOTT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF; OTHER EMPLOYEES OF SCOTT COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT WHOSE NAMES AND TITLES ARE UNKNOWN; SCOTT COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT; DORIS WILKER, SOCIAL WORKER WITH SCOTT COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT; MARGARET SUBBY, DIRECTOR OF SCOTT COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES; OTHER EMPLOYEES OF SCOTT COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT WHOSE NAMES AND TITLES ARE UNKNOWN, APPELLEES. SCOTT GERMUNDSON, MARLENE GERMUNDSON, SARA GERMUNDSON AND MELISSA GERMUNDSON, APPELLANTS, v. SCOTT COUNTY; SCOTT COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE; R. KATHLEEN MORRIS, SCOTT COUNTY ATTORNEY; R. GEHL TUCKER; NANCY PLATTO; MARY TAFS; KAREN KANDIK; SCOTT COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; DOUGLAS TIETZ, SCOTT COUNTY SHERIFF; MICHAEL M. BUSCH, SCOTT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF; PATRICK MORGAN, SCOTT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF; DAVID EINERTSON, SCOTT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF; NORMAN PINT, SCOTT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF; OTHER EMPLOYEES OF SCOTT COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT WHOSE NAMES AND TITLES ARE UNKNOWN; SCOTT COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT; DORIS WILKER, SOCIAL WORKER WITH SCOTT COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT; MARGARET SUBBY, DIRECTOR OF SCOTT COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT; OTHER EMPLOYEES OF SCOTT COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT WHOSE NAMES AND TITLES ARE UNKNOWN; LARRY NORRING, OFFICER WITH JORDAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, APPELLEES. JUDITH ANN KATH, APPELLANT, v. R. KATHLEEN MORRIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SCOTT COUNTY ATTORNEY; UNNAMED SCOTT COUNTY EMPLOYEES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS OF SCOTT COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA; AND SCOTT COUNTY, APPELLEES.
Nos. 88-5018 thru 88-5025.United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.Submitted October 20, 1988.
Decided March 3, 1989.
Thomas Hunziker, Minneapolis, Minn., David Albright, Bloomington, Minn., Marc Kurzman, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellants.
David Sturges, New Prague, Minn. Jon Iverson, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota; Harry H. MacLaughlin, U.S.D.C., Judge.
Before ARNOLD and MAGILL, Circuit Judges, and ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge.
ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
[1] These appeals arise out of an investigation into alleged sexual abuse of children in Scott County, Minnesota. Most of the facts and legal issues have already been thoroughly set forth and resolved in a previous appeal, Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437(8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987). As a result of our decision in that appeal, summary judgment was entered in favor of the following groups of defendants: Guardians ad litem, therapists, police officers of the City of Jordan, Minnesota, the Scott County Board of Commissioners, the County Attorney, the County Sheriff, and deputy sheriffs. [2] In the present appeal, we are asked to review the order of the District Court[1] granting motions for summary judgment by Scott County, the Scott County Department of Human Services, and a group of
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social workers. In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152 (D.Minn. 1987).
[3] We affirm. The opinion of the District Court exhaustively states the facts and discusses the applicable law. We see no point in embellishing at length on Judge MacLaughlin’s able opinion. As the District Court carefully explained, the theory of substantive due process is properly reserved for truly egregious and extraordinary cases, and violations of state law, in and of themselves, are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have carefully considered the arguments of appellants, and we are well aware that they have suffered much. Their allegations, however, do not rise to a constitutional level. There may well have been deviations from proper investigative procedure in the delicate area of child sexual abuse. These matters, how ever, are best left to the common law of torts. We note that plaintiffs’ pendent state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice by the District Court, and we approve this action. [4] Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed on the basis of the opinion of the District Court.[2]